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Abstract
Some cases of financial fraud invite inquiries about the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanism in financial distress companies. This study empirically 
examines whether the financial distress moderate the impact of corporate governance
mechanism to earnings management. The sample of this study is manufacturing 
companies listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2010 -2012. Discretionary 
accruals are used as a proxy for earnings management, while financially distressed and 
non-distressed firms are identified based on Altman Z-score test. Corporate governance
mechanism is measured by four characteristics of the audit committee, i.e. size (total 
number of audit committee members), independence (audit committee composition), 
activity(frequency of audit committee meeting), and expertise (the number of audit 
committee have finance or accounting background).This study finds that (1) financial 
distress does not moderate the impact of total members of audit committee to earnings 
management; (2) financial distress does not moderate the impact of frequency of audit 
committee meeting to earnings management; (3) financial distress does not moderate 
the impact of audit committee composition to earnings management; (4)financial 
distress moderates the impact of audit committee finance/accounting knowledge to
earnings management. These results suggestthat the effectiveness corporate governance 
is low, and finance/accounting literacy of audit committee should be alert.
Abstrak
Beberapa kasus manipulasi keuangan pada perusahaan yang mengalami kesulitan 
keuangan mengundang pertanyaan terkait efektifitas mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan.
Penelitian ini secara empiris menguji apakah kondisi kesulitan keuangan dapat 
memoderasi pengaruh mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan terhadap manajemen laba.
Sampel dari penelitian ini adalah perusahaan sektor manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa 
Efek Indonesia periode 2010-2012.Discretionary accruals digunakan sebagai proksi 
untuk manajemen laba, sedangkan kondisi kesulitan keuangan diidentifikasi 
menggunakan uji Altman Z-score. Mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan diukur dengan 4 
karakteristik komite audit, yaitu ukuran (jumlah anggota komite audit), independensi 
(komposisi komite audit), aktivitas (frekuensi pertemuan komite audit), dan keahlian 
(jumlah anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang keuangan atau akuntansi).
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa (1) kondisi kesulitan keuangan tidak memoderasi 
pengaruh jumlah anggota komite audit terhadap manajemen laba; (2) kondisi kesulitan 
keuangan tidak memoderasi pengaruh frekuensi pertemuan komite audit terhadap 
manajemen laba; (3) kondisi kesulitan keuangan tidak memoderasi pengaruh komposisi 
komite audit terhadap manajemen laba; (4) kondisi kesulitan keuangan memoderasi 
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pengaruh jumlah anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang keuangan atau 
akuntansi terhadap manajemen laba. Hasil ini menunjukkan bahwa efektifitas tata 
kelola perusahaan masih rendah dan anggota komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang 
keuangan atau akuntansi harus mewaspadainya.




Business competition today requires company to improve its performance in 
order to survive, even win the competition. According to Veronica (2012),inability of 
the company to survive in the global competition may cause the company runs into 
diminution of business volume that may ultimately have an impact on business 
bankruptcy. One of the cause sof business bankruptcy is sustaining financial distress 
problem in a company. According to Platt and Platt (2002) in Atmini (2005), financial 
distress is a decline stage of financial condition in a company, which occurred prior to 
the bankruptcy or liquidation. This condition is usually characterized by delivery
delays, declining product quality and delay bill payments from the bank.
In practice, a financial distress company tends to do variety ways to hide their 
real performance to the external parties, such as investors, creditors, and public. One of 
them is perform earnings management. According to Jaggi and Lee (2002) in Jaggi and 
Sun (2006), it has been well documented in the literature that managers of financially 
distressed firms would have a strong motivation to engage in earnings manipulation for 
sending positive signals or reducing the impact of negative signals emanating from 
financial distress.
Around the year 2000s, the business world was surprised by the bankruptcy of 
several major companies in the United States such as Enron Corporation(2001),
WorldCom(2002), and Xerox Corporation(2001). According to Purnomo and Pratiwi 
(2009), Enron’s earnings manipulation was done by the executive and their auditor, so 
Enron can increase their profit approaching 1billion USD,which actually never existed.
Similarly, Xerox manipulates its earnings by window dressing their revenue in the 
amount of USD 6 billion. The similar case in Indonesia is financial fraud of PT. Kimia 
Farma. PT. Kimia Farma overstated profit in their 2001 financial report (Tempo, 2002). 
All of these fraud scan happen because of ineffectiveness of companies’ corporate 
governance mechanism.
According to Ruzaidah and Takiah (2004), audit committee is one of the key 
elements in the corporate governance structure that helps control and monitor 
management. The audit committee contributes to development of company strategic 
plan and is expected to provide input and recommendations to the board with regard to 
any financial or operational matters. Charan (1998) and Craven and Wallace (2001) in 
Rahmat and Takiah (2008), prove that an effective audit committee would focus on 
improving the company performance and competitiveness, particularly in a changing 
business environment which is beyond the control of the company. Thus it can be said 
that corporate governance has a significant effect on the company financial condition. 
However, Chagaanti et al. (1985) in Wardhani (2006) who examine the structure of
corporate governance, i.e. the composition of the board of directors, did not find 





Lo et al. (2010) prove that good corporate governance can reduce earnings 
management practice in a company. Similar result was also obtained by Uadiale (2012)
who does research on Nigeria listed companies. Uadiale (2012) found that the
mechanisms of corporate governance as measured by board independence and audit
committee negatively affect earnings management practices.
Mostly previous studies focus on effectiveness corporate governance mechanism 
in normal financial condition firms. Limited studies have explored effectiveness of 
corporate governance in financial distress firms. This is important because financial 
distress firms increase company motivation to increase their earnings, in order to hide 
their real financial performance to the public. If corporate governance mechanism is 
effective in the financial distress firms, it should reduce the tendency to manage their 
earnings. However, if the organs of corporate governance collude to the management 
interest, they will not provide any effect in order to reduce the earnings management 
tendency.
In sum, this study intends to examine whether financial distressthat occurs inthe 
companywillmoderate theeffectof corporate governance toearnings management.
Objects that areexamined in this studyaremanufacturing companies listedon the 
Indonesia Stock Exchangein the period2010 – 2012.
This study utilizes characteristics of audit committee as proxy of corporate 
governance mechanism. The audit committee characteristics include size, meeting 
frequency, composition and financial literacy of audit committee. The result of this 
study shows that only existence of audit committee members who have accounting 
background will reduce the firm tendency to manage up its earning. Other audit 
committee characteristics do not provide any significant effect to the earnings 
management practices in financial distress firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Literature review and 
hypothesis development are discussed in section two. Section three discusses research 
method.The result of study and discussion are explained in section four and five. 
Finally, the conclusion is presented in section six.
2. Research Method
2.1. Sample 
Sample of this study is manufacturing companies that were listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2010 – 2012. Only companies that have 
complete data, reporting currency in Rupiah, and firm with the period ended on 
December are selected as sample. All data are collected from the financial statements
and annual reports of the companies of the year 2010- 2012. The final sample is 252 
firm years, as illustrated on Table 1.
Table 1. Sample Selection
Descriptions 2010 2011 2012 Total
Manufacturing firms listed at Indonesia Stock 
Exchange
132 136 136 404
Less: Reporting currency other than Rupiahs 10 11 25 46
Less: Unavailable data 10 10 9 29
Less: Fiscal period ended other than December 31 0 1 1 2
Sample 112 114 101 327
Less: Outlier 75
Final sample 252
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The impact of corporate governance to earnings management moderated by 
company financial condition was investigated using multivariate linear regression.The 
main regression model is defined in the following equation:
EM = a + b FD + c ACSIZE + d ACCOMP + e ACMEET + f ACLITERACY + g 
FD*AC SIZE + h FD*AC COMP + i FD* ACMEET + j FD* ACLITERACY + k* 
LEVERAGE+ l*PB RATIO +  e........................................................ (1)
Where,
EM earnings management,
FD financial distress condition, 
ACSIZE audit committee size, 
ACCOMP audit committee composition 
ACMEET audit committee meetings
ACLITERACYaudit committee literacy in finance or accounting
LEVERAGE leverage
PB RATIO price book ratio
2.3. Variables
2.3.1.Earnings Management
In this study, earnings management is dependent variable. Earnings management 
is measured by Performance – Adjusted Current Discretionary Accruals (PACDA) 
based on the research of Jaggi and Sun (2006).There are some steps to calculate
PACDA:
1. Finding the value of the coefficient on the following regression model:
=  0 + 1
1
+ 2( )................................................................ (2)
Where,
CA = Current accruals, reflected by net income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and amortization minus operating cash flows scaled by the total 
asset at the beginning of fiscal year t.
Lag asset = Total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year t.
ev = Net sales in year t less net sales in year t-1 scaled by the total asset at 
the beginning of fiscal year t.
2. Insert the estimated coefficient of regression model (2) to calculate the expected
current accruals(ECA), using the following equation:
=  0 + 1
1
+ 2( )....................................... (3)
Where,
= Account receivable in year t less account receivable in year t-1, scaled 
by the total asset at the beginning of fiscal year t..
3. Calculate discretionary current accruals (DCA), using the following equation:
= ........................................................................................(4)
4. Calculate PACDA using the following  equation:
PACDA = DCA – median DCA of the matching portfolio  
..............................(5)
Notes:
Median DCA is calculated by divided all of the samples into 10 groups based on the 
value of ROA in year t-1. After that we calculate the median DCA from each group.
2.3.2.Financial Distress
In this study, financial distress is a moderating variable. Financially distressed 




Z-score = 0.012*(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 0.014*(Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets) + 0.033* (Earnings before Interest and Tax/Total Assets) + 0.006*(Market 
Value Equity/Book Value of Total Debt) + 0.999*(Sales/Total Assets)................... (6)
Company is scored one(1) if Altman Z-Score is smaller than 1.81, and otherwise scored 
zero (0).
2.3.3.Corporate Governance(CG)
In this study, CG is an independent variable. The proxy of company corporate 
governance mechanism is four characteristics of audit committee, they are (1) audit 
committee size (AC SIZE), (2) meeting frequency of audit committee (AC MEET), (3) 
audit committee composition (AC COMP) and (4) financial/accounting literacy of
audit(ACLITERACY). Audit committee size is measured by total number of audit 
committee members. Meeting frequency is measured by frequency of audit committee 
meeting in the fiscal year t. Audit committee composition (AC COMP) is measured by 
the ratio of non-executive audit committee to total members of audit committee.
Financial/accounting literacy is measured by the number of audit committee that have
accounting or finance educational background and professional experience.
2.3.4.Control Variables
This study controls other factors that influence firm earning management 
practices. Two control variables are leverage and Price to book ratio 
(PBRATIO).Leverage is proxy for company risk, and price to book ratio is proxy for 
growth. We compute leverage by dividing book value of total debt at year total assets in 
year t-1. Price to book ratio is measured by firm’s closing price in year t scaled by 
firm’s par value in year t. Higher leverage firms under debt covenant hypothesis (Watss 
and Zimmerman, 1986) increase tendency to increase current earnings. Besides, growth 
company has more accrual therefore increase accrual earnings.
3. Result and Discussion 
3.1. Descriptive
Table 2 and 3 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in regression 
models. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for distress companies, while Table 3
shows the descriptive statistics for non-distress companies.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Distress Companies
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
AC SIZE 219 0 4 3,0600 0.4560
AC MEET 219 0 41 6,0300 5,0570
AC COMP 219 0 3 0,1123 0,2597
AC LITERACY 219 0 3 1,8800 0,9010
PACDA 219 -0,6202 0,6654 0,0236 0,2433
LEVERAGE 219 -6,3945 2,9838 0,4918 0,6749
PB RATIO 219 0,0174 359 16,7386 37,3058
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Non- Distress Companies
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
AC SIZE 33 3 4 3,1800 0,3920
AC MEET 33 2 14 4,9400 2,6090
AC COMP 33 0 2 0,2576 0,5049
AC LITERACY 33 0 4 1,9400 1,0290
PACDA 33 -0,7584 0,9257 -0,0205 0,3523
LEVERAGE 33 -4,2204 7,3524 0,5500 1,4863
PB RATIO 33 0,3000 2085 215,1328 548,7608
In addition, we check the univariate mean difference t-test between the two group 
of companies, i.e. distress and non-distress companies. We find that there is no 
significantly different mean in term of audit committee size, meeting, composition, and 
literacy. However, the mean difference test for variable PACDA indicates that distress 
companies more likely to use earnings management to increase income. This may be 
done for sending positive signals or reducing the impact of negative signals emanating 
from financial distress. On the other side, non-distress companies more likely use 
earnings management to decrease income to avoid taxes or to avoid public monitoring.
While, mean difference for variable PBRATIO in indicate that non- distress company’s 
stock price is more expensive than distress company’s stock price.
3.2. Classical Test Assumptions
To obtain the efficient and accurate regression results, the data must be free from 
violations of classical assumptions. There are four requirements that must be fulfilled, 
i.e. normality test, heteroscedasticity test, autocorrelation test, and multi collinearity 
test.
Normality test is done by one sample Kolmogorof Smirnov test. Then, this test 
also uses box plot method in order to identify outlier data. After removing all outlier 
data, asymp. Significant(2-tailed) is greater than 0.05. These results indicatethat the 
regression model haspassed the normality test.
Heteroscedasticity test is done by Glejser test. The significance value must be 
higher than 0.05 in order to indicate that there is no heteroscedastisity problem. There is 
no heteroscedasticity problem in this data. 
Autocorrelation test is done by Durbin-Watson test. The value of Durbin-Watson 
must be larger than du but smaller than 4 – du (du < DW < 4-du) as indication free 
from autocorrelation problem. The data does not indicate autocorrelation problem.
Multicollinearity test is done by checking the value of Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and the amount of Tolerance. The VIF must be no more than 10, and the 
Tolerance must be more than 0.1. The data does not show any multi collineraity 
problem, except for moderating variables as predicted.
3.3. Hypothesis Testing
The result of linear regression in Table 4 shows that there is no significant impact 
of total members of audit committee to earnings management. The relation does not 
change in financial distress company. Thus H1 is rejected.
There is no significant impact of frequency of audit committee meetings to 
earnings management. Considering firm financial condition, the result shows that 
financial distress does not moderate the impact of frequency of audit committee 
meeting to earnings management. It can be seen from the significance value of FD*AC 




The impact of audit committee composition to earnings management is not 
significant. Firm financial condition also does not moderate the impact of audit 
committee composition to earnings management. Thus H3 is rejected
The only significant impact of audit committee characteristic to earning 
management is accounting literacy.  More member of audit committee with accounting 
literacy support company to manage its earnings up. However, in financial distress 
firms, more member of audit committee reduce tendency of company to manage its 
earnings. As shown on table 4, financial distress have significant negative moderating 
effect on the relation between audit committe literacy to earnings management practice. 
Thus H4 is accepted.
Table 4. RegressionResult (t-test)
* = significant at 5 %.
The study shows that only finance/accounting literacy attribute of audit 
committee influences firm earnings management practice. Audit committee size, 
meeting frequency and composition are not significant attributes in order to detect 
earnings management practice in company.It may suggest that the effectiveness of audit 
committee in Indonesia listed companies is still low, although it is mandatory for them 
to have an audit committee and there is rigid requirement for audit committee members 
and activities. This may happen because the appointment of audit committee may 
perhaps only be done by a company for regulatory compliance (rule of Indonesia 
securities exchange commission (Bapepam, or now OJK) No. Kep-643/BL/2012) in 
respect to size, composition of audit committee, and meeting frequency.
In term of finance/accounting literacy of audit committee, this study finds
interesting result, which this attribute influences differently when the company 
financial condition is considered. In the financial distress company, more members of 
audit committee who have finance or accounting background will reduce firm earnings 
management practices. However, if the company financial condition does not take 
account, it will increase firm earnings management practice. This finding suggests that 
they utilized their expertise in finance or accounting in optimum. They will support the 
earnings management when the company is in the good condition; it may be the 
earnings management is for efficient reason (Scott, 2012). However, when the company 




AC SIZE -0.070 0.718
AC MEET -0.016 0.419
AC COMP -0.196 0.192
ACLITERACY 0.196 0.000*
Leverage 0.003 0.000*
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For control variables, only leverage has positive significant relation to earnings
management. It support debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) that 
closer company to debt violation, as measured by higher leverage, it will increase 
probability of company to increase their earnings by accruals management.
4. Conclusion
Best practice in audit committees is an important determinant of good corporate 
governance. An effective audit committee has a significant bearing on the financial 
performance and future direction of the company. Being one of the key players in good 
corporate governance, an effective audit committee would bring companies to a higher 
level of performance. 
This study examine whether the financial distress moderate the impact of good 
corporate governance to earnings management. Moderation of financial distress can 
strengthen the implementation of CG or weaken the implementation of CG. It is said to 
strengthen the implementation of CG, in financial distress condition, the audit 
committee of the company would provide an effective monitoring of earnings 
management. Therefore the company can resolve from distress condition. 
But on the other side, moderation of financial distress will weaken the 
implementation ofCG if in financial distress condition the company does not pay 
attention again the implementation of CG. The company will do the earnings 
management for sending positive signals or reducing the impact of negative signals 
emanating from distress condition. 
This studyshows that financial distress moderate the impact of audit 
committeefinance/accounting knowledge to earnings management. It can be happen 
because audit committee with knowledge in accounting and finance is capable to
increase public’s confidence about credibility and objectivity of published financial 
statements. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), knowledge in accounting and 
finance provides a good basis for audit committee members to examine and analyse
financial information. The educational background becomes an important characteristic 
to ensure audit committees perform their roles effectively.Consequently, audit 
committee members who have financial knowledge would be more professional and 
more adaptable to change and innovation. Therefore, audit committees with finance or 
accounting literacy members are expected to adopt high standards of accountability and 
level of achievement and to strive for excellent corporate image and performance. This 
is the reason why accounting knowledge of audit committee can reduce the earnings 
management infinancial distress company.
This study indicates that financial distress does not moderate the impact of three
other audit committee characteristics (size, meeting frequency, and composition) to 
earnings management. This may happen because the appointment of audit committee 
may perhaps only be done by a company for regulatory compliance respect to size, 
composition of audit committee, and meeting frequency.  
This paper finds that, on average, both financially distressed and non-distressed 
companies meet the minimum requirements on audit committee as prescribed by rule of 
Indonesia securities exchange commission (Bapepam, or now OJK) No. Kep-
643/BL/2012in terms ofaudit committee size and composition.However, these 
requirements are not enough to increase the effectiveness of audit committee in doing 
their job.
This paper has several limitations. First, the result of this study should be 




used Altman Z-Score model to identify financially distressed and non-distressed 
company.
References
Alkdai, Hussain Khalifa Hussain. and Hanefah, Mustafa Mohd. 2012. Audit Committee 
Characteristics and Earnings Management In Malaysian Shariah – Compliant 
Companies. Business and Management Review. Vol. 2(2): 52- 61.
Altman, E. 1968. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance.Vol. 23(4): 589-609.
Atmini, Sari. 2005. Manfaat Laba dan Arus Kas Untuk Memprediksi kondisi Financial 
Distress Pada Perusahaan Textile Mill Products dan Apparel and Other Textile 
Products Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Jakarta.Proceedings Simposium Nasional 
Akuntansi VIII, Solo:Universitas Negeri Sebelas Maret.
www.bapepam.go.id, 2012, 
http://www.bapepam.go.id/pasar_modal/regulasi_pm/peraturan_pm/IX/IX.I.5.pdf
Baxter, P. dan Cotter, J. 2009.Audit Committees and Earnings Quality. Accounting and 
Finance. Vol. 49(2): 267-290
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M., Courteau, L., 2004. The effect of audit committee 
expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management.Audit.: 
A J. Pract. Theor. 23 (2): 13–35
Ching, K. M. L., Firth, M., and Rui O. M. 2002.Earnings management, corporate 
governance and the market performance of seasoned equity offerings in Hong 
Kong.Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics.Vol. 2(1):73-98
Davidson, et al. 2005.Internal Governance Structures and Earnings Management.
Accounting and Finance. Vol. 45: 241 - 67
Duh RR,  Lee WC, Lin CC. 2009. Reversing an impairment loss and earnings 
management: The role of corporate governance.The International Journal of 
Accounting. Vol.44: 113-137.
Farida YN, Yuli P, Eliada H. 2010.Pengaruh Penerapan Corporate Governance 
terhadap Timbulnya Earning Management dalam Menilai Kinerja Keuangan pada
Perusahaan Perbankan di Indonesia.Jurnal Bisnis dan Akuntansi.Vol 12(2): 69-80
Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P. A. 1984.Upper Echelons: The Organisation as a 






Jaggi, Bikki and Sun, Lili. 2006. Financial Distress and Earnings Management: 
Effectiveness of Independent Audit Committees.Proceeding Conference:
Auditing Midyear Conference, Los Angeles, CA.
Kang, et al. 2011.The Effectiveness of Audit Committees For Low- And Mid – Cap 
Firms. Managerial Auditing Journal.Vol. 26(7): 623 - 650
Klein, A., 2002. Economics Determinants of Audit Committee 
Independence.Accounting Review,Vol. 77(2): 435–452
Lin, J.W., Hwang, M.I., 2010. Audit quality, corporate governance, and earnings 
management: a meta-analysis. International Journal of Auditing.Vol.14:57–77.
Lo, Agnes W.Y, Raymond M.K. Wong and Michael Firth, 2010. Can Corporate 
Governance Deter Management From Manipulating Earnings? Evidence from 
Manajemen & Bisnis Berkala Ilmiah
Vol. 12 No. 2 (September 2013)
236 
 
related – party sales transactions in China.Journal of Corporate Finance.Vol. 16:
225-235.
Margareta, Silvia. 2012. Studi Hubungan Antara Praktik Good Corporate Governance, 
Kualitas Auditor, dan Leverage Dengan Praktik Earnings Management Pada
Industri Perbankan Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) Periode 2008 
– 2010 [Skripsi]. Surabaya: Universitas Surabaya.
Purnomo, Budi S. dan Pratiwi, Puji. 2009. Pengaruh Earning Power Terhadap Praktek




Rahmat, Mohd Mohid. and Iskandar, Takiah Mohd. 2008. Audit Committee 
Characteristics in Financially distressed and non- distressed companies.Malaysian 
Accounting Review, Vol. 8(1): 19-36.
Ruzaidah, R. and Takiah, M. I. 2004.The effectiveness of audit committee in monitoring 
the quality of corporate governance, Corporate Governance: An International 
Perspective, Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, Kuala Lumpur, pp.
154-75.
Scott, William R., 2012. Financial Accounting Theory.Toronto, Canada: Pearson 
Prentice Hall.
Uadiale, OlayinkaMarte. 2012. Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting. Vol. 3(3): 1-10
Veronica, Suliana. 2012. Pengaruh Karakteristik Komite Audit terhadap Financial 
Distress Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar Di BEI Periode 2009 –
2011.[Skripsi]. Surabaya: Universitas Surabaya. 
Wardhani, Ratna. 2006. MekanismeCorporate Governancedalam Perusahaan yang 
Mengalami Permasalahan Keuangan (Financially Distressed Firms).Proceedings 
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi IX, Padang: Universitas Andalas.
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Prayogoet al.
